Introduction
The cultural industries have undoubtedly attained considerable visibility and a degree of notoriety in recent years as a policy object. However, they sit uneasily within the public policy framework. One reason for the ambivalent position that the cultural industries occupy is that they are commercially orientated and commonly regarded as mass or low culture. Yet, they are situated under the umbrella of "cultural policy": a perspective that has traditionally championed elite cultural forms funded from the public purse. This tension is compounded by a fiscal crisis and the decreasing legitimacy of the nation-state as a provider of public goods. Moreover, the nature of the cultural industries (mainly for profit) has changed markedly in recent years, and now exists in increasing tension with the cultural sector (mainly not for profit) -the traditional object of cultural policy.
The net result, in the view of some commentators, is a reversal of cultural values and a submission to the market as the source of all value. The cultural industries have thus become an irritant to cultural policy makers for two reasons. First, the cultural industries embody and promote alternative aesthetics and market values. And second, some of the contributions of the cultural industries to society (and particularly the economy) can be measured in economic terms. Thus, for some the co-existence of the cultural industries with traditional cultural policy undermines the latter.
It may be argued that cultural policy has also become a problem for the cultural industries. From the perspective of the cultural industries, cultural policy more generally does not embody the tools or understanding of the processes that animate them aside from an aesthetic benchmark (which they are usually condemned for failing to meet). Moreover, the very "stuff" of the cultural industries is commonly presented as something that is, on the one hand, intrinsically anarchic and individualistic -a quality that defies planning or management, 1 let alone being an object of public policy; on the other hand, the cultural industries are viewed as commercial in their orientation and thus should not be deserving of public subsidy. Such views, although heavily stereotyped, are expressed by protagonists, politicians and policy makers, and disclose a number of assumptions and pre-conceptions. Set in these terms, it is understandable that the cultural industries may be viewed as outside the normal purview of public policy. Taxonomic problems relate to the ontological status of the cultural industries, as well as to the practicalities of information collection on new "social objects". The aim of this article is to re-imagine the space of the cultural industries and their governance. Before we reach this stage, a considerable amount of "ground clearing" will be necessary in order to establish a robust foundation for these arguments. It is the objective here to question some of the assumptions about the cultural industries and policy to promote them, and in so doing open up some spaces within which questions about the governance (corporate and more generally) and public policy may be discussed. In so doing, the article seeks to open up a position that neither falls into the assumption that the cultural industries are wholly public or wholly private goods. Moreover, it seeks to consider the ways in which the cultural industries are governed through organisational forms, regulations and markets: some of which are primarily in the public sector, some of which are not.
The article is divided into three parts. In the first, questions of definition are reviewed. In the second part, cultural policies (and by default cultural industries policies) are examined in order to uncover the key concepts of culture they are based upon. The final section, on governance, develops an argument that seeks to open up a space where the tensions between the definition and understanding of the cultural industries, policy objectives and means of policy deliver can be resolved.
Definitional Questions
The Cultural Industries A basic problem with the development of policy for the cultural industries concerns the issue of definition. First, it is useful to put aside the cultural-creative industries debate. The term "creative industries" is a political construct first deployed by the British government in 1997 under a new Labour administration. The term "cultural industries" had been used previously by Labour-run metropolitan councils to point to more or less the same activities. There was no explicit discussion of why the term changed, nor a statement of a comprehensive definition in distinction to "cultural industries" (or any other term).
A best estimate is that there were two reasons for the adoption of the term. First, there was a direct political one. The new Labour administration sought to position itself as politically centrist and very keen to distance itself from what it regarded as electoral disadvantages -namely, policies associated with "old" Labour. Specifically, policies associated with either the old metropolitan councils, particularly those associated with the Greater London Council as with the cultural industries, were especially sensitive. Policies for the cultural industries had been pioneered by the metropolitan councils as one part of an industrial regeneration strategy, and in the case of London, as a political mobilisation strategy.
2 Thus, for New Labour, cultural industries policies were tainted with left-leaning "old" Labour values. The party did position itself positively in support for the cultural industries, and Tony
Blair made a number of key speeches prior to election to this effect (Harris 2003) . Shortly after the election, a new Department of National Heritage was re-branded the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. One of its first actions was to set up a "Creative Industries Task Force" (CITF). Its first agenda item was to propose a working definition of the term "creative industries". The definition arrived at was: "Those activities that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the general exploitation of intellectual property" (DCMS 1998) . This definition relates to the other reason for the choice of the term "creative industries". As Garnham points out elsewhere in this special issue, there is a legacy first developed by the 1979-1997 Conservative administrations for the promotion of the "information" or "knowledge" economy. The specification of intellectual property in the definition, and the overall objective of "recommend [ing] steps to maximize the impact of the UK creative industries at home and abroad" (DCMS 1998) underlines this. Despite the production of two Mapping Documents' (DCMS 1998 (DCMS , 2001 , the CITF managed to produce little in the way of policy. However, the significance of the Mapping Documents cannot be overestimated: they opened a door to Treasury funding and gained an economic respect for the sector it had never had before as simply "the arts lobby".
3 A more subtle, but wider ranging, dimension of "creativity" in Labour policy has been the call by a committee reviewing educational curricula across all school ages to promote creativity in order to prepare people to work in the knowledge economy (NACCCE 1999) . Underpinning the knowledge society position is the idea is that with manufacturing in decline, the United Kingdom has to use "knowledge" to sustain its competitive advantage. Alongside the usual high-technology, bio-technology and pharmaceutical industries, the new star is believed to be "the creative industries". In effect, this initiative has sought to ringfence a number of commercial applications of culture and exploit their intellectual property. It is for this reason that the creative industries focus is primarily on outputs and "property rights". Any discussion of production and manufacture is problematic for two reasons. First, this initiative is supposed to move beyond manufacture. Second, manufacture and arts and culture are figured as oppositional; this has been reflected in policy. Consequently, when the creative industries are articulated with the broader cultural field, the dualisms of economic/private in the non-economic/public arts are re-established.
The formation of the creative industries adopted by the British government is powerfully linked into a political programme. 4 However, the term is of little analytical value per se; it would be difficult to identify a non-creative industry or activity (Pratt 2004a) . While the same point can be levelled at the cultural industries (which industry or activity cannot be described as having a cultural dimension?), at least the cultural industries have a putative activity (such as film-making or writing a book) to produce a "cultural" object; the creative industries' object is creativity itself. It is for this reason that I prefer to use the term "cultural industries". Despite these linguistic acrobatics, the question of defining the field has not been addressed. 5 Commonly, the questions asked are "What is culture?" or "What is a 'cultural object'?", then, experts decide what is, and is not, culture. There is widespread agreement of some aspects of this (e.g., fine art, classical music, perhaps pop music, film). However, inclusion of computer games, sport or even tourism quickly divides opinion. 6 This is what I have termed elsewhere as the "breadth question" (Pratt 2001) . Necessarily, there is no universal definition as cultural formations are situated in spaces and times; the answer must be locally, culturally and politically defined.
However, this is not the end of the investigation. A critical further dimension must be considered -the "depth" issue. What the depth question relates to is which activities are necessary for a cultural output. If we take a theatre performance, we need a text, actors and directors (all of whom need training and development). We also need technicians, back-and front-of-house staff, and a building in which to perform and rehearse. There are positive interactions between all of these participants, and all rely on the others for the final outcome. Thus, logically, one needs to include these activities in the "ensemble" of cultural production. This is essentially the notion behind what I have variously called the "cultural production chain", "circuit" or "web" system. This is more formally expressed in Figure 1 . Such a definition opens up a tension as suggested above as it includes issues of manufacture and non-cultural occupations. The DCMS definition of "cultural sector" has recently been re-defined and based upon this logic; the "creative industries" remain an uneasy "sub-grouping" (DCMS 2003) . The critical innovation of such a definitional and conceptual shift is significant. Whereas previously only "cultural outputs" were considered (and prior to this indirect impacts) (Pratt 2001) ; the new approach is concerned more with process and context. This brings into view a range of institutional structures that sustain and enable continued cultural production: in effect, this constitutes a new visibility. Here, although the evidence is sparse, we can note the strikingly diverse institutional forms of, for example, the film industry, television, computer games, fine art, classical music, popular music, commercial theatre, public theatre, and so on.
Depth
Content origination. The generation of new ideas -usually authors, designers or composers -and the value derived from intellectual property rights;
Exchange. The relationship to the audience or marketplace. This takes place through physical and virtual retail, via wholesalers and distributors, as well as in theatres, museums, libraries, galleries, historic buildings, sports facilities and other venues and locations;
Reproduction. Most cultural industry products need to be mass-produced; examples include printing, music, broadcasting, production of designed materials and product;
Manufacturing inputs. Ideas must be turned into products and prototypes using tools and materials; this might cover the production and supply of things as diverse as, for example, musical instruments, film or audio equipment or paint;
Education and critique. To cover both training and the discourse in critical ideas; and Archiving. To include libraries and the "memory" of cultural forms.
Breadth
Visual Art, Performance, Audio-Visual, Books and Press, and perhaps Sport and Health, and Heritage and Tourism. The implication is twofold. First, a "one size fits all" cultural industries strategy may be ineffective and, second, the cultural industries may differ from other industries, social or cultural activities. So, generic policies may not be ideal either. Moreover, it creates a more specific policy agenda, one that implies that a thorough understanding of cultural production is central (Pratt 2004b) . As I note below, these tensions are further amplified by the elision of policy objectives concerning instrumental and substantive policies for the cultural industries.
Cultural Industries Policies
It would be logical to develop cultural industries policies from the basis of a firm understanding of their object. However, as we have noted above, such an understanding of the object has been slow to emerge. First, this is due to conceptual confusion; second, the practical problems of collecting information; and third, political pragmatism. Thus far the dominant information collected has been of the employment and output variety; little systematic coverage exists of the more qualitative dimensions of organisation and institutional contexts or the production of cultural commodities. Moreover, precious little attention has been paid to the way that cultural production spans both public and private funding sources. As we will point out below, this hybrid nature of cultural production sits uneasily with the mono-culture and dualistic character of financing arrangements with respect to this domain.
The aim of this section is to not to review cultural industries policies per se, as they are very few and far between. Characteristically, they are subsumed under cultural policies more generally, or they sit under the ideological umbrella of the cultural sector and thus share (often neither in an unacknowledged nor directly addressed manner) the assumptions that commonly underpin the (usually publicly funded) arts and cultural sector. The objective is to explore the existing frameworks for conceptualising and analysing cultural policy in general, and to explore the "fit" with the cultural industries. As we will note, there is a central question concerning the conceptualisation of the cultural industries vis a vis cultural policy, and the empirical rate of change the cultural industries are undergoing at any point in time that generates increasing tension between the two domains. Beyond this, there are a number of foundational questions concerning whether a fundamentally social or economic stance is taken; and, finally, what relation cultural industries have to, and what conception is implied of, the state.
Dilemmas
A document produced for the Council of Europe (Matarasso & Landry 1999 ) and aimed at policy makers represents the task of cultural policy making as similar to tightrope walking, requiring continual adjustment to preserve the "elusive point of balance". 7 Matarasso and
Landry organise their discussion of the 21 dilemmas around five themes: frameworks, implementation, social development, economic development and management. Each group of issues is presented with an 11-point scale and a checklist. The objective is for policy makers to resolve each point in turn. Without doubt, this list is comprehensive and provides a useful overview of the practical issues associated with cultural policy making (see Figure 2) . This document is useful, but it does not provide the analytical tools to move toward a resolution of the tensions. First, the issue of a number of concepts of culture are glossed over; Matarasso and Landry do not address the differences between the cultural industries and the wider sector. As already noted in this article, there are good reasons for having a differentiation. Second, they assume a nation-state that is (spatially and temporally) unchanging in its forms, underpinnings and legitimation.
Cultural Discourses
The notion of culture is constructed through a number of intersecting discourses providing particular means of mobilising the notion and defining its object. These discourses are selectively emphasised to frame cultural (industries) policies. In this section, I sketch out three discourses that are deployed in policy making.
Economic
The most widely discussed means of establishing a framework for analysis of the cultural sector, and one justification mobilised to support the case for public intervention, is by using an economic lens; specifically one configured by the atomistic assumptions of neoclassical economics.
8 Here the critical issue is whether the object of cultural policy is a public or private good. Such a distinction itself obscures historical preferences and a priori decisions to treat culture as if it were a public or private good (Throsby 2001 commodities as if they were any other, and evaluating their direct or indirect impacts on the economy. Policy makers may seek to promote or channel investments if they are perceived to produce benefits (for either the cultural sector or those that it benefits) in excess of the administrative costs. An extension of this logic will sustain support for cultural activities if they produce social or political benefits; commonly deployed examples range from social inclusion and regeneration, export earnings or national and personal identity.
Second, there are rational choice, or preference, approaches. These focus on voter behaviour and argue that government policy is justified if there is popular support for it. A variant of this is where the government seeks to sustain a higher purpose (moral values) through the limitation of public choices (via censorship, for example), despite their preferences.
The third area is that of public goods -that is, goods that if consumed by one can be consumed by all others for no extra cost). Notionally, a free-to-air radio broadcast is of such character. It can be argued that no individual is likely to provide such a service, and thus it is logical to provide it collectively. A variant of this model is that of "merit goods" -public goods that the government sees some benefit in promoting, but for which there is no current demand from the public.
A fourth area in a sense extends the third and in part accounts for, and seeks to respond to, why the public do not see value in "meritorious goods". The first example of this might be education; the development of specific tastes will create "markets" for particular goods. A second example is those activities that suffer from a "cost disease" -namely, they have a fixed labour requirement that will cause price inflation as wages rise, and therefore become more expensive. Live classical music and theatre are often placed in such a category. So, in both cases, a subsidy for goods and their production might be justified. The whole issue again revolves around a question of what is of "value", and obscures how such decision making takes place.
It is on the basis of these four broad criteria that state intervention has been justified within economic discourse. While they point to a role of the state, they do not necessarily disclose the nature of that policy implementation or precisely its object.
Ideological/Political
The second discursive position taken to frame culture in an ideological field; this is perhaps the oldest established position. Very broadly, it has three faces: humanist, aesthetic and nationalist. The first broadly articulates the position that (the correct) culture is uplifting and civilising, adding the notion of humanity and elevating the human spirit. In short, to understand and articulate culture it is an essential part of becoming and perfecting ourselves as human beings. The second, the aesthetic, concerns the aspiration to perfectibility; that the creation and appreciation of "great art" will draw the subject closer to transcendent values. Those advocating this viewpoint commonly express notions such as the equivalence and absolute nature of categories like "truth and beauty".
Finally, there is the articulation of cultural particularism to the notion of cultural achievement. This is commonly expressed through an articulation of particular artefacts to the nation-state and national identity. Discussions of nation-state building by writers such as Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992) highlight the role of cultural activities such as the invention of traditions and the construction of imagined communities in this process.
9 Thus the development of equivalences between art and the nation-state lead to notions of identity being bound up with particular art forms. 10 One consequence of this process is the appropriation of particular pieces of art with a nation-state identity. The recent case in the United Kingdom of the use of National Lottery funds to "save" Raphael's Madonna and the Pinks "for the nation" is illustrative.
11
Critically, all three positions rely upon an acceptance of particular hierarchical authority and expertise systems to legislate on priorities and "what is best". This places them in opposition to the market in that while it expresses one form of popular support, it does not impinge upon "absolute values" (see also the discussion of "merit goods" above).
Social
The question of where culture is "located" is clearly a vexing one. The ideological and political dimensions are suggested above, and we can see extensions in the work of outreach arms of the state -for example, the British Council or even the Central Intelligence Agency in the case of the United States (see Stonor Saunders 1999 ). An alternate inflection of the ideological role of the state is to view cultural policy as an arm of welfare policy. This may at first sight seem a strange juxtaposition; however, if we view it as a mode of managing and positioning policy, it fits quite well. Take the core principles of "excellence" and "free 'service' at the point of access" that fit both health and common conceptions of cultural "rights". Such a formulation has considerable analytic benefit through making the role of the state integral, rather than as an "addition".
Generally, this formulation has been all but ignored in the literature. The social welfare formulation takes as its starting point an institutional or evolutionary conception of economics as opposed to neo-classical economics; immediately shifting the debate from its economic manifestation. A very provoking analysis is outlined by Toepler and Zimmer (2002) , who take Esping-Andersen's (1990) seminal analysis of European welfare systems as a template for cultural policy. In their paper, they, following Esping-Andersen, seek out the social and political institutional formations and trajectories. Here they capitalize on one of Esping-Andersen's strengths, showing the diversity of state forms that deliver quite different outcomes for the nominally same input. Their paper is illuminating in that it breaks with the universalism, with regard to the state, of much cultural policy discourse, especially that of the neo-classicists. They highlight the different families of policy making based upon a palette of assumptions and social forms found in (groups of) different nation-states.
Another innovative dimension pointed up is the admission to the conceptual possibility of commodification and de-commodification. Traditionally, perspectives polarise the two (as in state or market). It is suggestive of a continuum, or hybrid, of public and private support of policy (the mix of public and private found elsewhere in the welfare system of most counties -e.g., health and education). There is not space here to discuss this at length. However, it is worth noting that this approach is the only one that takes the contextual formation of policy making and implementation seriously.
While this approach has much to recommend it in terms of the institutional texture of cultural policy, it does not delve into the issue of definitions of culture: one could re-draw the "families of policy" 12 based upon different concepts. As such, they in effect work with, rather than question, the assumption that culture is a public good, and as such it is an accepted object of state policy. Thus far policy makers do not seem to have drawn upon these insights. While this approach does bring into focus institutional forms, less attention is paid to organisation forms and styles. Clearly relevant here are the interesting, but conceptually dislocated, debates about decentralisation of policy making (Kawashima 1997; Everitt 1999) . Second, it pays no attention to the particular institutional forms of the private sector, and specifically of the cultural industries. Third, there seems limited space for quasi-public and partnership forms. There is considerable evidence of "arms length" and "regulatory control" becoming core tools of government with a "light touch". Essentially, this is an issue of engaging with change: the changing form of state governance, and of corporate governance: and, the relations between the two and the position of civil society. These issues are picked up in the final section of this article.
Governance
While it may help to create a neat analytical distinction between different discourses of culture mobilised in policy making, as we noted above, practitioners tend to draw upon a mixture of rationales. The positions set out above do help to account for the different lenses through which culture can be viewed. These formulations seek to position us on one or other of the market-state-ideological boxes. This section seeks to address this very problem by shifting the focus to the ways in which objects can be governed.
So far I have discussed some concepts of culture and the policy objectives that underpin them. I have already shown that the concepts and practice of cultural activity are subject to change, a process that has been exacerbated through the industrial and mass production of cultural artefacts. I think that it would be fair to say that we have currently reached a point of crisis in many nation-states and regions regarding cultural policies. Commonly accepted definitions of "culture" have both widened and deepened. Consequentially, the impact of cultural activities is felt more widely throughout society. Whereas, in the past, it seemed possible to base policy on aesthetic judgements; now, we have for many years had the challenge of political judgements, and more recently those of economic judgements.
13
Consequentially, the current challenge would seem to be one of creating a frame of reference within which all of these elements can be considered.
A traditional perspective on this issue would begin with the alternatives of state intervention and free markets. However, the concept that I want to develop is more nuanced than this in that it attempts to capture the quality of the intervention. In this way, we can develop ideas about how "culture" is defined, and what can be regulated and controlled, and on which terms. It is for this reason that I prefer the term "governance" rather than "policy" as it encompasses policy, the definition of artefacts and their production, as well as the legitimisation and implementation of policy.
There are many different interpretations of the notion of governance; the one this article draws upon is that discussed by Jessop (1998 Jessop ( , 2000 . Jessop (1998) makes the distinction between the institutions and agencies charged with governing (government), and the modes and manner of governing (governance). The latter he defines as the coordination of different institutional orders (such as economic, political, legal, scientific or educational systems) each of which has its own complex operational logic such that it is impossible to exercise effective control of its development from outside that system. This notion has very strong resonances with the type of problems that we have noted above with respect to the cultural sector in general, and the cultural industries in particular (see, e.g., Grabher 2001) .
Beyond this Jessop argues that the modes of coordination are various, as well as temporally and spatially embedded. He writes that markets, states and government all fail, but the alternative of substituting one institution with another, which he says is a common response, is not the only one possible. Jessop claims that he is not suggesting a "third way"; rather seeking "new balance points" (see also Hirst 1994). Historically, he points to the example of the shift of economic governance from Fordism to Post-Fordism that has required new forms of coordination. Less deterministically, he also argues that the relative changes of states, markets and societies cannot be simply managed with one overall structure. Jessop's point is that traditional institutional responses (by states, markets and governments) have tended to fall into two modes -the anarchy of the market or organisational hierarchies (the state) -beyond these he offers self-organisation (heterarchy).
The Possible Spaces of Cultural Governance
To think only of markets or states as the only possible spaces of solution to complex problems is, in Jessop's view, to be trapped within traditional dualisms and patterns of failure of governance. The current tensions both within cultural industries policies, and between cultural policy and cultural industries policy, and between other domains are illustrative of this impasse in the cultural field (see, e.g., Craik et al. 2003) . If we now articulate the three discourses of culture with Jessop's three forms of governance, we can sketch out a fully articulated field of cultural industries policy making that focuses debate on appropriate tensions and their means of resolution. Debates about ownership and control are central to questions of cultural industries practice; in Jessop's schema, ownership is elided with control, arguably in a manner that is too assumptive of a particular rationality. Setting this aside Figure 3 is a representation of the field. In the spirit of a provocative thought experiment, one can range over the field. This is illustrated next where I map some more familiar positions of cultural policy. The objective here is not to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the other possibilities that have not been explored.
FIGURE 3
The field of cultural policy making.
Starting from top left (cells 1 and 2), we can perhaps find the space for a form of governance that equates with Nationalisation or national ownership. It has been a common form of economic governance, but one now rejected by most governments. It is based upon state (or common) ownership of property. Moving to the right (cells 2 and 3), we find the indicative space of the various policies of national Protectionism. These are in part economic, but rooted in strategic protection of the nation-state. Again, this form of regulation has been historically used in the economic sphere, but is also the one that could characterise much fine art policy -for example, the building of strategic collections of national art, saving "national art treasures" from export or simply strategic collections for national museums to maintain their international audience. 
In the bottom left, cells 7 and 8 best characterise Privatisation. Note, this is not the "no policy" option as it is commonly presented; it is the particular application of a form of market regulation and market values. We are familiar with variants of this form of activity in the last twenty years in many spheres of activity. As should be clear, it does not equate with "no government". In most nation-states, this is the mode of governance that characterises popular music, much film, and, increasingly television, computer games and multimedia.
Finally, cells 8 and 9 illustrate a sphere that has remained relatively neglected until recently. However, it is in many respects the most interesting. It is being used in some areas of economic activity. What it essentially comprises of is a rich social organisation of forms of exchange: what can be termed "Sectoral Governance". It is premised upon a strong social and political mobilisation, and hence, it is not surprising to find it is most common at a local level. For the sake of brevity we can point to the forms of social governance that are found in Denmark and the Northern Italian industrial districts, as well as some of those in Southern Germany (see Cooke & Morgan 1998) .
Clearly, there are many other possibilities, only a few of which have been explored by policy makers. On Jessop's prompting, it is useful to consider the row of cells 4 to 6 as they represent an untried possibility. Interestingly, many commentators have suggested that this form of governance characterises the cultural industries (see Grabher 2001; Pratt 2004a ) and prompts the question of the importance of striving for an organisational isomorphism between "policies" and "practices".
Imagining New Spaces of Governance of the Cultural Industries
Rather than providing a summary of the argument already laid out, in this concluding section I want to offer an initial exploration of one set of new spaces of the governance of the cultural industries. Heterarchical governance offers a potential key with which to unlock the totality of interaction, finding strengths and weaknesses in the organisation of production and its governance (see Pratt 1997; Jeffcutt & Pratt 2002; Pratt 2004a) . I want to suggest that it is useful to extend the notion of governance beyond that which the state and the market seek to control. This seems implicit in Jessop's concept of governance, but the specific tensions between corporate and entrepreneurial forms, or social and economic forms (profit and not-for-profit) are not highlighted. This issue is a challenge that is presented by the cultural industries.
If cultural policy is not to become obsolete or irrelevant, it has to be drawn into a new conception of governance that acknowledges the existence of the market, but is actively involved in the shaping of that market. Moreover, it should also involve the discussion of what the market is failing to do, and what can be done by other means. The key point, represented by cell 6 in Figure 3 , is the need for a more open and democratic form of decision making over investment priorities. This will logically figure a radical shift away from a simple focus on subsidy to a more broadly based support for culture, as well as a more fiercely debated one. This obviously throws up a huge new agenda for debate. Imagining such a new agenda will entail some significant challenges to the form of policy making.
First, institutions shaped and developed for traditional arts policies may not be appropriate for the cultural industries or new policy more generally; it may well involve working across traditional departments of government, as well as between levels of government and across the boundaries of government, civil society and commerce.
Second, and related, the nature of expertise required by policy makers is likely to be quite different. Instead of simply acting as arbiters of taste and value, policy makers are more likely to be involved in strategic and longer term questions about the development of cultural forms, and cultural participation, as well as the developing relationships between "pure" cultural forms and "applied" forms. All of those involved in the governance process will need to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of organisation of the production and reproduction of cultural activities. This will involve gaining an insight into the role of institutions and networks in training, and innovation, as well as in the execution and display of cultural artefacts. Given the huge problems involved in making a most rudimentary quantitative survey of the creative industries, this task is likely to be particularly challenging. However, effective debates about governance are unlikely to develop unless a rich and deep understanding of the processes to be governed is elaborated.
Finally, a whole new infrastructure of public participation will need to be created if legitimacy for this activity is to be sustained. It is unlikely that such activity could be sustained at a national level unless it was firmly rooted at the local level and inserted in all fields of cultural activity.
NOTES

1.
This is the source of the viewpoint that public policy and the cultural industries are an oxymoron; it also echoes a comment by Adorno (1991) regarding the tension between culture and bureaucracy.
2.
An industrial regeneration strategy was informed by the Alternative Economic Strategy, which positioned metropolitan councils as policy laboratories that sought to exemplify opposition and a future beyond the, then, ruling Conservative national administration.
3.
In an era of output-indicator-driven managerialism, the deployment of indicators such as employment, output and export earnings were very potent.
4.
Accordingly, there are problems in exporting this concept to other political and institutional contexts.
5.
The CITF did define the creative industries, listing 13 industries in all.
6.
The debates about popular culture and its value articulated within the discipline of Cultural Studies sought to destabilise the old hierarchies. However, it is notable that this has always been a sensitive issue within government. There is a commonly expressed unease among politicians and policy makers about the Department of Culture, Media and Sport being viewed as the "Department of Fun".
7.
The paper subsumes the cultural industries within cultural policy.
8.
This is the justification for culture to reside outside of economic calculation.
9.
Neil MacGregor, the director of the British Museum, notes that it was the first institution in Britain to bear the name "British"; it was established by the Crown to be a showcase for the history of the world. The funding arrangements were through a blind trust; thus establishing the "arms length principle" that characterises many national art policies. A potent example in the of the linkage between art, culture and identity in the United Kingdom can be found in Leonard (1997) . 10. Recent World Trade Organisation debates have led to France seeking to deploy the "cultural exceptionalist" clause to defend its subsidy of the French film industry. This exceptionalist case need not apply to new art forms; in fact it is often deployed to defend "old" cultures or "folk" cultural products.
11.
There is not space here to discuss the multiple issues such as Raphael's non-British identity and the construction of a "national" art gallery. 12. Esping-Andersen allocates similar state and policy forms to "families of states'": hence, his three worlds (families) of welfare capitalism. 13. Both of these are informed and exacerbated by the flows of migration (short-term and longterm) of peoples with different cultural heritages. This incipient cosmopolitanism creates a tension between mono-cultural policy and democracy. This is the mainspring of many debates about culture in a globalising world, and the tensions between homogeneity and heterogeneity.
